Probleme, Gogule?

Am avut discutia asta de multe ori, si in carne si oase, si pe Internet: structura demografica a Rusiei afecteaza maniera in care e in stare sa-si proiecteze puterea in zonele sale de vecinatate.

In cele ce urmeaza, o analiza taioasa, limpede precum cleshtarul de Prussia, precum sticla din Muntii Urali, despre problemele pe care le are Rusia in Asia Centrala si despre diferenta dintre ce putea sa faca acum 50 de ani sau 100 de ani sau 150 de ani si ce nu mai poate acum. Totul bazat pe o minte clara, pe analiza si pe date demografice, impletite cu o buna cunoastere geo-politica.

Ce mai: jos palaria! Sint datz dracu shpionii ashtia publici si oficiali de la Stratfor, dom'le...

:blink:

PS: Pun aici doar componenta de analiza demografica din articolul Stratfor. Restul cititi-l la ei (felul in care aceasta modificare de structura demografica afecteaza jocul de putere al Rusiei din Asia Centrala, in contextul crizei din Kirghistan).

PPS: Cititi cu atentie despre barierele geografice pe care Rusia de secole incearca sa si le stabilizeze / securizeze si veti vedea de ce ursul sovietic e atit de poftitor de carne romaneasca. Vedeti ca acolo scrie si de Muntii Carpati, si de Rep. Moldova, si de felul in care pofta militara a Rusiei da batai de cap si cosmaruri romanilor noaptea.

PPS: Sunt curios in cite ore si restul minute de cind postez acest articol va aparea rusofilul de servici, stimabilul domn Gheorghe, sa ne explice ca de fapt nu e asha, ca americanii sint niste nemernici insetatzi de singe nevinovat care maninca ficati de copii la gratar si ca de fapt mareatza maica Rusie nici nu are picioarele slabe si moi, din contra, este un colos de care nu e bine sa ne ridem, si nici nu se gindeste la prostii, ci din contra doreste pacea internatzionala si infratzirea intre popoare. Pe bune: ia uitati-va voi la minutul postarii si pe urma la momentul in care apare dom' Gheorghe sa ne beshteleasca un pic, asha, pe la nas, cum scrie la fisha postului, ca de ce nu-i iubim noi pe rushi, ca toata lumea ar trebui sa-i iubeasca pe rushi, ca si ei ne iubesc pe noi, de sute de ani ne tot iubesc cu organu gros si cu membru viguros... :wink:

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[
de aici incolo, bucata semnificativa din articolul Stratfor ]

Russian Geography, Strategy and Demographics
Russia’s geography is extremely open, with few geographic barriers to hunker behind. There are no oceans, mountains or deserts to protect Russia from outside influences — or armies — and Russia’s forests, which might provide some measure of protection, are on the wrong side of the country. The Russian taiga is in the north and, as such, can only provide refuge for Russians after the country’s more economically useful parts have already fallen to invaders (as during the Mongol occupation).

Despite its poor geographic hand, Russia has managed to cope via a three-part strategy:

1. Lay claim to as large a piece of land as possible.
2. Flood it with ethnic Russians to assert reliable control.
3. Establish an internal intelligence presence that can monitor and, if need be, suppress the indigenous population.

Throughout Russian history, this strategy has been repeated until the Russian state reached an ocean, a mountain chain, a desert, or a foe that fought back too strongly. In many ways, the strategies of the Kremlin of 2010 are extremely similar to those of Catherine the Great, Ivan the Terrible or Joseph Stalin.

But it is no longer the 17th century, and this strategy does not necessarily play to Russia’s strengths anymore. The second prong of the strategy — flooding the region with ethnic Russians — is no longer an option because of Russia’s demographic profile. The Russian birth rate has been in decline for a century, and in the post-Cold War era, the youngest tranche of the Russian population simply collapsed. The situation transformed from an academic debate about Russia’s future to a policy debate about Russia’s present.

The bust in the birth rate in the 1990s and 2000s has generated the smallest population cohort in Russian history, and in a very few years, those post-Cold War children will themselves be at the age where they will be having children. A small cohort will create an even smaller cohort, and Russia’s population problems could well evolve from crushing to irrecoverable. Even if this cohort reproduces at a sub-Saharan African birthrate, even if the indications of high tuberculosis and HIV infections among this population cohort are all wrong, and even if Russia can provide a level of services for this group that it couldn’t manage during the height of Soviet power, any demographic bounce would not occur until the 2050s — once the children of this cohort have sufficiently aged to raise their own children. Until 2050, Russia simply has to learn to work with less. A lot less. And this is the best-case scenario for Russia in the next generation.


The Kyrgyzstan Crisis and the Russian Dilemma
Simply put, Russia does not have the population to sustain the country at its present boundaries. As time grinds on, Russia’s capacity for doing so will decrease drastically. Moscow understands all this extremely well, and this is a leading rationale behind current Russian foreign policy: Russia’s demographics will never again be as “positive” as they are now, and the Americans are unlikely to be any more distracted than they are now. So Russia is moving quickly and, more important, intelligently.

Russia is thus attempting to reach some natural anchor points, e.g., some geographic barriers that would limit the state’s exposure to outside powers. The Russians hope they will be able to husband their strength from these anchor points. Moscow’s long-term strategy consistently has been to trade space for time ahead of the beginning of the Russian twilight; if the Russians can expand to these anchor points, Moscow hopes it can trade less space for more time.

Unfortunately for Moscow, there are not many of these anchor points in Russia’s neighborhood. One is the Baltic Sea, a fact that terrifies the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Another is the Carpathian Mountains. This necessitates the de facto absorption not only of Ukraine, but also of Moldova, something that makes Romania lose sleep at night. And then there are the Tien Shan Mountains of Central Asia — which brings us to the crisis of the moment.